During the past decade, a number of researchers have noted that individuals often view themselves more favorably than seems objectively warranted (Miller & Ross, 1975; Regan, Gosselink, Hubsch, & Ulsh, 197S) . Thus, for example, Fischoff and Beyth (197S) found that people recall their powers of prediction as being superior to those they demonstrate. Schopler and Layton (1972) noted that their subjects unreasonably viewed their interventive behavior as successful. Similarly, gamblers investigated by Blascovich, Ginsburg, and Howe (197S) overestimated the probability of successful outcomes in actual gambling situations.
In organizations, such pervasive "selfserving biases" would result in overly optimistic future planning. Evidence for this effect was found unexpectedly by Kidd and Morgan (1969) when they noted that production managers persistently predicted better performance for their operations than was later obtained. Although the managers' predictions may, of course, reflect pressure to "look good," they may also be derived from overly optimistic self-impressions.
The present research was intended to dis-cover whether self-serving biases operate at the level of overall business planning and marketing. Biases toward the overprediction of organizational growth are of particular interest because they may affect not only the manager and his or her organization but suppliers and competitors as well. For instance, unrealistic biases toward exponential growth, if held by each competitor in a market, may lead to ruinous attempts at overexpansion and competition for scarce resources. Despite the obvious need for realism among managers and potential managers, the growth and competitive ethics commonly reported in Western economies (cf. Heilbroner, 1974; Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972) suggested to us that self-serving biases may have an important influence on future planning. Managers who believe that they are superior to the average might reasonably expect to perform in a superior manner in the marketplace. Because superior performance is frequently measured in terms of comparative sales volume, we expected to find a generalized tendency to predict and plan for higher sales than those possible for the average firm to attain. More specific hypotheses are considered in the instructions to the studies reported here.
Studies 1 and 2 used a questionnaire to ask two samples of management students to predict their success as marketing managers of a firm newly entering a competitive market.
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Study 3 examined the real growth plans of a sample of corporate presidents; varying degrees of caution were induced as a result of the method of questioning. The final discussion notes the existence of data indicating biases in other types of organizational planning.
Studies 1 and 2
The market size for any new product is necessarily open to some question. Assessments of the abilities of key decision makers in the organization, and of the efforts they are likely to undertake, become critical. In Studies 1 and 2, students were asked to assume the role of a sales manager predicting the sales of a new product. We expected the students to manifest self-serving biases directly through the assertion that their capabilities are higher than those of their classmates (Hypothesis 1). We also expected that they would subscribe to a variety of normative managerial values, such as growth and success (Hypothesis 2).
Self-serving biases held by the students might then be directed toward enacting the managerial values. Specifically, their beliefs were expected to lead the students to predict that the sales of their own firm would grow at a faster rate than total market growth, and would thereby quickly exceed the sales volume of established competitors (Hypothesis 3). Finally, we thought that optimism concerning sales projections would be found to correlate positively with both ability bias and the acceptance of managerial values (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Subjects. Undergraduate management students enrolled in an introductory marketing course (Study 1; « = 37) and in a senior year management game (Study 2; « = 35) served as subjects. Study 2 was an exact replication of the earlier study; results have been combined unless otherwise noted.
Questionnaire. Subjects participated in groups of 4 or 5, individually completing the "marketing study" problem and questionnaire set. The instrument contained a marketing problem concerning "Product X." * The problem was followed by questions concerning the subject's perceived ability and expectation of future success, and by questions probing desire for success and normative beliefs concerning growth (see Tables 1 and 2 ). Other than for the marketing problem described below, all responses were assessed on 7-point scales.
Marketing problem. The marketing problem presented data concerning a hypothetical industry presently split evenly between five competitors. The subject was asked to take the role of sales manager in a sixth firm poised to enter the market and to estimate both his or her own sales of the product and total industry sales for the 4 succeeding years. The description was stated as follows:
Industry X (producing Product X) was founded several years ago. Your firm has already invested in the technology to produce Product X and no additional investment or time is required. The industry currently has five competitors and each accounts for $1.5 million in annual sales. Total sales for this year are therefore $7.5 million; 5 years ago, sales were only $1.5 million for the industry. The sales pattern is predictable and, as sales manager, you must market your firm's product for the first time and estimate its potential.
Residts and Discussion
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that subjects would see themselves as relatively more competent than their classmates and would agree to certain normative managerial values. The results strongly supported both hypotheses (see Table 1 ). In general, our subjects valued success and felt that they not only had the ability to succeed but would; they accepted sales growth as a valid indicator of success and felt that their own firm should do better than others.
To some extent, this success orientation on the part of our subjects is justified: They have successfully entered college and survived the competition once there. Nonetheless, the extent of their enthusiasm is plainly unrealistic, especially when they are comparing themselves with their classmates. For example, of the 72 students participating in the study, only 10 felt that they were merely of average intelligence relative to their own classmates and only 2 thought themselves below average.
As is indicated in Table 2 , our third hypothesis, which predicted that the students would project high growth rates for their organizations, was also supported. On the average, our subjects predicted that they would overtake competition in annual sales within 3 years. Only 18 of the 72 subjects predicted that their own firm's sales would be below the industry average (less than -J-of the market) in the 4th year.
Hypothesis 4 suggested that the myopic sales projections are related to the biases and managerial values described above. In fact, we found that the predicted correlations were nonsignificant; thus Hypothesis 4 was not supported. Although an actual relationship between the sales projections and the questionnaire items may have been obscured by ceiling effects with the questionnaire responses, it is also possible that self-concept and planning biases are independent of one another.
Study 3
To the extent that the results of Studies 1 and 2 reflect similar beliefs of actual executives, they suggest a systematic error that * p < .001 by a two-tailed binomial test indicating that the number of subjects (54 out of 72) predicting sales greater than those of the average firm was significantly greater than expected by chance. presses organizations toward myopic overexpansion. It seemed likely to us that managers are subject to the same attributional processes and cultural values as students of management. Nonetheless, an executive's survival in business places a premium on realistic planning. Consequently, we expected that when accuracy is required, managers would be found to correct for excessive optimism.
Study 3 surveyed corporation presidents in the fall of 1975. As in the earlier studies, we thought that the presidents would predict an expanding overall market and a faster than average growth for their own firms relative to that market (Hypothesis 5). However, when cautioned to be realistic, we expected the businessmen to lower their projections both for the market and for their own firms relative to it (Hypothesis 6). Finally, we anticipated that businessmen would be more cautious in predicting rising sales for their firms if they had experienced failure in their earlier predictions (Hypothesis 7).
Method
Subjects. The presidents of 48 New York state manufacturing firms were randomly chosen from a chamber of commerce directory. Subjects were interviewed by telephone at their offices. AH subjects were male; interviewers were females.
Procedure, Interviewers introduced themselves as management students making a business attitude survey. After the subjects agreed to participate, all were asked to predict their own sales in the following year relative to those of competition. A 7-point scale, anchored by "much better" and "much worse" (than competitors), was used.
Sixteen subjects were then assigned to each of the three following caution induction conditions: (a) Light caution subjects merely estimated and explained expected inventory changes in the coming year, (b) Moderate caution subjects rated how closely their businesses had recently performed to expectations and their faith in their own predictions, (c) Heavy caution subjects were told that overoptimism leads to business cycles and recession (the economy was then recovering from recession); they were asked to estimate the rate of growth of competition. Thereafter, all respondents evaluated the growth or decline rate of the average firm in their industry and reevaluated their own firm's relative growth rate.
Results and Discussion
As predicted by Hypothesis S, our executive subjects overpredicted their firm's performance relative to competition: For the first question, expected value = 4.00, M = 3.04; for the difference, i(47) -5.294, p < .001. In numbers, 27 of the 48 executives predicted that their firm would do better than the average, whereas only 4 estimated that they would do worse (p < .001 by a binomial test). Despite the intervening caution manipulation, we also found that the executives predicted an increase in the total size of their respective industries, M = 5.73%, t(4T) -2.896, p < .005. Although this latter result was hypothesized, it might also be legitimately predicted as a result of prospective economic recovery; the recovery does not explain the relative optimism the executives expressed for their own firms, however.
Assertions concerning overall market growth were also subjected to a one-way analysis of variance. As predicted by Hypothesis 6, a slower market growth rate figure was given following the heavier caution manipulations, F(2, 45) = 6.414, j><.01; Ms = -3.19%, 8.94%, and 11.44% in the heavy, moderate and light caution conditions, respectively. A similar analysis of results from the final question concerning growth rates relative to competitive concerns did not reach significance, however. Hypothesis 6, therefore, received mixed support. Apparently, the executives were willing to readjust their views of the total market as a result of our caution manipulation, but they continued to feel confident that their own market share would grow within it.
The most poignant caution induction should be the acknowledged failure of prior predictions; competitive survival requires adjustment to reality. In fact, executives who admitted that their businesses had previously failed to perform as anticipated were less likely than others to predict that their organizations would outpace the average (measured only in the moderate caution condition), ?(14) = .494,p < .05 (one-tailed test). Likewise, those who felt that they were unable to accurately predict sales trends were also more cautious in their predictions for their organization, ?'(14) = .602, p< .025, one-tailed. Although the significance levels of these two effects are modest, they both support Hy-pothesis 7, suggesting that unfortunate experience can deflate myopic judgments. The correlational relationship between predictive failure and lowered expectations must, of course, be treated with some degree of caution because it may arise from a variety of factors extrinsic to those under consideration here. Nonetheless, it suggests the tentative conclusion that managers entertain a myopic impression of their firm's likelihood of success relative to competition, and that the impression is difficult to dislodge except in conditions forcing the admission of failure.
General Discussion
Firms grow at different rates. Nonetheless, the studies reported here have found a general belief among managers and students of management that their own firms would possess unusually high growth rates. Other studies have, of course, found decision biases concerning additional types of planning (cf. Kidd & Morgan, 1969; Langer, 197S) . Taken together, these studies indicate that self-serving biases are a wide-ranging phenomenon that can affect managerial decision making through the process of overly optimistic planning. We should emphasize, however, that more work is needed to determine the extent to which managers translate their myopic expectations of success into hard business decisions.
Finally, our data imply that the problems of "clemarketing," the scaling of marketing efforts to take advantage of sudden resource scarcities or declining market size, may be more difficult to handle than is commonly thought. Demarketing is most often treated as a matter of logistics and economics in which the manager properly plans to maximize profits despite shrinking sales (Kotler, 1974) . The psychological aspect may be equally important, however: To successfully plan for shrinking markets, the manager must be brought to at least anticipate the possibility of declining sales. Study 3 indicated that aspirations are somewhat sensitive to experience but may not be sensitive to less salient caution inductions. On this basis, it seems doubtful that most managers are willing to make demarketing plans realistically until they are forced to do so by declining sales.
-Preliminary work in a related study series has also indicated that management students tend to competitively withdraw from a shared and shrinking resource pool rather than to risk unilateral investments that might be depleted by competitors (#<.001). This may be a behavioral manifestation of self-serving bias in resource management. Additional information on this study may be obtained from the first author.
